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SOMAESTHETICS  
AND ARCHITECTURE
A Critical Option1
I
This paper explores the use of somaesthetics for architecture, paying special 
attention to the vexed issue of criticality. However contested the disciplinary 
status, denition, and function of architecture may be, the eld of architecture is 
thoroughly familiar to this audience, while somaesthetics is probably still a mys-
tery that demands an introduction.2 Rooted in the classical pragmatist tradition 
that regards experience as a crucial philosophical concept while afrming the 
body as the organizing core of experience, somaesthetics can be briefly dened 
as the critical study and meliorative cultivation of how we experience and use the 
living body (or soma) as a site of sensory appreciation (aesthesis) and creative 
self-fashioning. It is therefore also concerned with the knowledge, discourses, 
practices, and bodily disciplines that structure such somatic care or can improve 
it.3 Somaesthetics is thus a discipline that comprises both theory and practice 
1 The indenite article in the subtitle of this paper is meant to emphasize that somaesthetics is 
being proposed here as merely one critical option for architecture. It is not being proposed as the 
only option or even the most important option, but simply as an option that I think is promising 
and worth considering for certain issues here discussed. I believe we need a plurality of tools in 
our critical toolbox; and such pluralism will prevent us from mistaking the loss or eclipse of one 
critical mode for a loss of criticality altogether. 
2 In an earlier paper I delivered to an architectural audience, I concluded by evoking the term 
somaesthetics but had no space to expand on it. See Richard Shusterman: “On Pragmatist Aes-
thetics,” in Joan Ockman: The Pragmatist Imagination (New York: Princeton Architectural 
Press, 2000), pp. 116 – 120.
3 For initial formulations of this project, see Richard Shusterman: Practicing Philosophy: 
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(the latter clearly implied in its idea of meliorative cultivation). The term “soma” 
indicates a living, feeling, sentient, purposive body rather than a mere physical 
body that could be devoid of life and sensation, while the “aesthetic” in somaes-
thetics has the dual role of emphasizing both the soma’s perceptual role (whose 
embodied intentionality contradicts the traditional mind/body dichotomy) and 
its aesthetic uses in stylizing one’s self and one’s environments but also in ap-
preciating the aesthetic qualities of other selves and things. Somaesthetics was 
conceived to complement my basic project of pragmatist aesthetics by elaborat-
ing the ways that a disciplined, ramied, and interdisciplinary attention to bodily 
feelings, methods, and performance could enrich our aesthetic experience and 
practice, not only in the ne arts but in the diverse arts of living.4 It originated as 
an attempt to overcome the rejection of functionality, embodiment, and desire that 
largely denes the Western tradition of philosophical aesthetics from Shaftesbury 
and Kant through Schopenhauer into the present, despite the fact that body and 
desire are so prominent in Western art and literature, even in its religious forms. 
Pragmatism and the Philosophical Life (New York: Routledge, 1997); “Somaesthetics: A Disci-
plinary Proposal,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 57 (1999), pp. 299 – 313; Performing 
Live (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000). The most comprehensive account of somaesthetics 
is in my Body Consciousness: A Philosophy of Mindfulness and Somaesthetics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008). For some of the more interesting elaborations and critical 
discussions of somaesthetics by other scholars, see, for example, Martin Jay: Somaesthetics and 
Democracy: Dewey and Contemporary Body Art,” Journal of Aesthetic Education, 36 (2002), pp. 
55 – 69; Eric Mullis: “Performative Somaesthetics,” Journal of Aesthetic Education, 40, (2006): 
pp. 104 – 117; Shannon Sullivan: “Transactional Somaesthetics,” in her Living Across and 
Through Skins (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2001); Cressida Heyes: “Somaesthetics 
for the Normalized Body,” in her Self-Transformations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); 
and Wojciech Malecki: “Von nicht diskursiver Erfahrung zur Somästhetik,” Deutsche Zeitschrift 
für Philosophie, 56 (2008), pp. 677 – 690.
4 For an articulation of that project, see my Pragmatist Aesthetics: Living Beauty, Rethink-
ing Art (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992); 2nd edition (New York: Rowman and Littleeld, 2000), which 
has an additional chapter devoted to somaesthetics.
A disciplined, 
ramified, and inter-
disciplinary attention 
to bodily feelings, 
methods, and perfor-
mance could enrich 
our aesthetic expe-
rience and practice, 
not only in the fine 
arts but in the diverse 
arts of living.
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Somaesthetics is a complex eld with three fundamental branches that involve 
multiple aspects. Analytic somaesthetics explores the diverse forms of somatic 
perceptions and practices and their function in our knowledge and construction 
of reality. Besides topics in philosophy of mind, ontology, and epistemology relat-
ing to the mind-body connection and the role of somatic factors in consciousness 
and action (whose study extends into physiology and neuroscience), analytic 
somaesthetics also includes the sort of genealogical, sociological, and cultural 
analyses that Foucault so powerfully introduced: how the body is both shaped by 
power and employed as an instrument to maintain it, how bodily norms of health 
and beauty and even the most basic categories of sex and gender are construc-
tions sustained by and serving social forces. 
Pragmatic somaesthetics is a more normative branch concerned with meth-
ods of somatic improvement and their comparative critique. Over the course of 
history, a vast array of methods have been recommended to improve our bodily 
experience and use: diverse diets, gymnastic training, martial and erotic arts, 
dance, aerobics, bodybuilding, cosmetics, massage, yoga, and Western disciplines 
of psychosomatic improvement like the Alexander Technique and the Feldenkrais 
Method, in which I am professionally trained. We can distinguish between holistic 
methods and more atomistic methods that focus on particular body parts of sur-
faces. Somatic practices can also be classied in terms of being directed primar-
ily at the individual practitioner herself or instead primarily at others. A massage 
therapist or a surgeon works on others but in doing t’ai chi ch’uan or bodybuild-
ing one is working more on oneself. The distinction between self-directed and 
other-directed somatic practices cannot be rigidly exclusive, since many practices 
are both. Applying cosmetic makeup is frequently done to oneself and to others; 
and erotic arts display a simultaneous interest in both one’s own experiential 
pleasures and one’s partner’s by maneuvering the bodies of both self and other. 
Moreover, just as self-directed disciplines (like dieting or bodybuilding) often 
seem motivated by a desire to please others, so other-directed practices like mas-
sage may have their own self-oriented pleasures.
Despite these complexities (which stem in part from the interdependence of 
self and other), the distinction between self-directed and other-directed body dis-
ciplines is useful for resisting the common presumption that to focus on the soma 
implies a retreat from the social. My professional training as a somatic educator-
cum-therapist has taught me the importance of caring for one’s own somatic 
state in order to pay proper attention to one’s client. In giving a Feldenkrais 
lesson of Functional Integration, I need to be aware of my own body positioning 
and breathing, the tension in my hands and other body parts, and the quality of 
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contact my feet have with the floor in order to be in the best condition to assess 
the client’s body tension, muscle tonus, and ease of movement and to move him 
in the most effective way. I need to make myself somatically very comfortable in 
order not to be distracted by my own body tensions and in order to communicate 
the right message to the client. Otherwise, when I touch him, I will be passing on 
to him my feelings of somatic tension and unease. Because we often fail to realize 
when and why we are in a state of slight somatic discomfort, part of the Felden-
krais training is devoted to teaching how to discern such states and distinguish 
their causes. 
Somatic disciplines can further be classied as to whether their major orienta-
tion is toward external appearance or inner experience. Representational som-
aesthetics (such as cosmetics) is concerned more with the body’s surface forms 
while experiential disciplines (such as yoga) aim more at making us feel better in 
both senses of that ambiguous phrase: to make the quality of our somatic experi-
ence more satisfying and also to make it more acutely perceptive. Much of my re-
cent book, Body Consciousness: A Philosophy of Mindfulness and Somaesthet-
ics, focuses on the project of experiential somaesthetics by examining the modes 
and uses of heightened somatic consciousness as a way of critically analyzing 
and resisting contemporary culture’s obsessive focus on advertised representa-
tions of external body norms of beauty that are oppressively used to stimulate 
feelings of inadequacy that impel us to buy products in the usually hopeless quest 
to meet those norms. 
Of course, the distinction between representational and experiential somaes-
thetics is one of dominant tendency rather than rigid dichotomy. Somatic prac-
tices typically have both representational and experiential aspects (and rewards), 
because there is a basic complementarity of representation and experience, outer 
and inner. How we look influences how we feel, and vice versa. Practices like diet-
ing or bodybuilding that are initially pursued for representational ends often pro-
duce inner feelings that are then sought for their own experiential sake. Just as 
somatic disciplines of inner experience often use representational cues (such as 
focusing attention on a body part in meditation), so a representational discipline 
like bodybuilding deploys experiential clues to serve its ends of external form, us-
ing critically trained awareness of muscular feelings to distinguish, for example, 
the kind of pain that builds muscle from the pain that indicates injury.5 This paper 
5 As experiential and representational somaesthetics are not mutually exclusive categories, 
they are also not exhaustive. Some somatic disciplines might be more distinctively classied as 
more performative than representational or experiential. Such disciplines are devoted primarily 
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will suggest how heightened experiential somaesthetic awareness can be critical-
ly deployed in the experience and design of architecture. But a corollary or recip-
rocal suggestion is also implied in my arguments: that architecture might in turn 
be critically deployed to promote more discriminating somaesthetic awareness.
Besides the analytic and pragmatic branches of somaesthetics, we also need 
what I call practical somaesthetics, which involves actually engaging in pro-
grams of disciplined, reflective, corporeal practice aimed at somatic self-improve-
ment (whether representational, experiential, or performative). This dimension of 
not just discoursing about somatic disciplines but systematically performing them 
is too often sadly neglected in academic approaches to embodiment, but it is cru-
cial to the idea of somaesthetics as practice as well as theory.
II
Somaesthetics should be pertinent for architecture if the soma is, and though this 
pertinence should be obvious, let me briefly highlight some features of the soma’s 
architectural centrality. First, the body—as a composite structure through which 
we live—is symbolically understood through tectonic notions. This symbolic con-
nection extends from ancient Greek philosophers like Plato, Roman architects 
like Vitruvius and early Christian thinkers like St. Paul, through Renaissance 
writers like Henry Wotton, and all the way into modern scientic critics of religion 
such as Freud.6 As Plato analogized the body’s architectural structure to a prison, 
so Vitruvius and St. Paul highlighted the body-temple analogy: Vitruvius in terms 
of their attractively symmetrical proportions of parts to whole, while St. Paul 
to increasing strength and performance; for example, weightlifting (as distinct from bodybuild-
ing), martial arts, athletics, gymnastics, etc. But to the extent that such performance-oriented 
disciplines aim either at the external exhibition of strength and skill or, alternatively, the inner 
feelings of those powers, we can assimilate them into either the dominantly representational or 
experiential mode. 
6 Plato’s famous image is most influentially evoked in the Phaedo (82d); Vitruvius: The Ten 
Books on Architecture, trans. M. H. Morgan (Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University Press, 1914), 
parenthetical page references to this text will be to this edition. Henry Wotton, in The Elements 
of Architecture (London, 1624 and based on Vitruvius) advised his architectural viewers “to pass 
a running examination over the whole edice, according to the properties of a well shaped man.” 
For more details on Wotton and 17th-century English architecture, see Vaughan Hart: “On Inigo 
Jones and the Stuart Legal Body: Justice and Equity…and Proportions Appertaining,” in George 
Dodds, Robert Tavernor, and Joseph Rykwert (eds.): Body and Building (Cambridge, Mass.: 
MIT Press, 2002), pp. 137–149; citation 138.  Freud explains the body-house analogy in his Intro-
ductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis (lecture 10), see the James Strachey edition (New York: 
Norton, 1966), p. 153, p. 159; see also Freud’s The Interpretation of Dreams, translated by A.A. 
Brill (New York: Modern Library, 1950), pp. 125 – 126.
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emphasizing “that your body is the temple of the Holy Ghost that is in you” (1 
Corinthians 6:19), an analogy that gets secularized by the time of Freud, whose 
interpretation of dreams identies the house as the dream-work’s symbol for the 
body, the place where one’s far from immaculate psyche is housed.
Besides this symbolic linkage, the soma fundamentally shapes some of the 
most basic concepts of architectural design. Consider the following features. 
1. If architecture is the articulation of space for the purposes of enhancing 
our living, dwelling, and experience, then the soma provides the most basic tool 
for all spatial articulation by constituting the point from which space can be seen 
and articulated. To see the world at all, we must see it from some point of view, a 
position that determines our horizon and directional planes of observation, that 
sets the meaning of left and right, up and down, forward and backward, inside 
and outside, and eventually shapes also the metaphorical extensions of these 
notions in our conceptual thought. The soma supplies that primordial point of 
view through its location both in the spatiotemporal eld and the eld of social 
interaction. As William James remarks, “The body is the storm-center, the origin 
of coordinates, the constant place of stress in [our] experience-train. Everything 
circles round it, and is felt from its point of view.” “The world experienced,” he 
elaborates, “comes at all times with our body as its center, center of vision, center 
of action, center of interest.”7 
2. Our lived experience of space essentially involves distance, and it is through 
the soma’s powers of locomotion that we get us to our sense of distance and 
space. The soma is thus what enables us to appreciate not only the visual effects 
and structural design features that rely on perceiving distance and depth, but 
also the multisensorial feelings of moving through space (with their kinaesthetic, 
tactile, proprioceptive qualites) that are crucial to the experience of living with, 
in, and through architecture. The concrete living space that the soma architec-
7 See William James: “The Experience of Activity.” In: Essays in Radical Empiricism (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), p. 86. 
“The body is the 
storm-center, the 
origin of coordi-
nates, the constant 
place of stress in 
[our] experience-
train. Everything 
circles round it, and 
is felt from its point 
of view.”
William James
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turally denes is not an abstract, fully homogeneous space but rather a space 
shaped by the body’s directionality—with its front, sides, and back. The essential 
architectural feature of façade expresses this notion of directional facing.
3. If architecture involves mass as well as space, then the soma likewise pro-
vides our most immediate sense of mass and volume. We feel the solid mass and 
thickness of our body; we also feel the liquids and gases that move through its vol-
ume. If verticality is basic to architecture, then the body is our basic experiential 
model of verticality and of the need to both deploy and resist gravitational forces 
to achieve it. The soma’s vertical posture and ability to maintain it in locomotion 
not only enables the particular perspective we have in seeing but also is what 
frees our hands so that we can use them to handle objects more effectively, to 
draw, design, and build skillfully. Moreover, the architecture of the body (the fact 
that we are essentially top-heavy—our heavier head, shoulders, and torso resting 
on our signicantly less massive legs) is part of what impels the soma to move 
since its vertical equilibrium is more easily sustained in motion than in standing 
still. It is hard to stand motionless in place for more than a few minutes, but we 
can enjoy walking for much longer periods without any strain.
4. Key principles of architectural form, as Vitruvius long ago remarked, seem 
derived from the soma. “Without symmetry and proportion there can be no prin-
ciples in the design of any temple”, he argues, dening these formal features 
in terms of the “relation” between the building’s “different parts to the general 
magnitude of the whole,” “as in the case of a well-shaped man” and justifying this 
relational principle on the grounds that “nature has designed the human body 
so that its members are duly proportioned to the frame as a whole.” He likewise 
claims the basic forms of circle and square can be derived from the body, as can 
the basic notions of measurement needed in design (72–73). A case for the soma’s 
role in determining architectural scale could similarly be made, just as one could 
argue that the body centrally informs the architectural feature of pillars, which 
Vitruvius saw as imitating male or female forms.
5. Despite its non-discursive materiality (which suggests mute dumbness), ar-
chitecture, as artistic design, is expressive. The soma’s non-discursive expressiv-
ity through gesture provides a central model for architecture’s expressive power. 
So much so that Wittgenstein deploys it to dene architecture and distinguish it 
from mere building. “Architecture is a gesture. Not every purposive movement of 
the human body is a gesture. And no more is every building designed for a pur-
pose architecture.”8
8 Ludwig Wittgenstein: Culture and Value (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), p. 42.
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6. The soma further provides a basic model for the relationship of architec-
tural design to the environment. An architecturally successful building must both 
t in and stand out as a distinctive achievement, just as a soma must do in order 
to survive and flourish, performing a balancing act of absorbing and relying on 
the wider natural and social resources of its environment but at the same time 
asserting its distinctive individuality. Just as we always experience a building in 
terms of its background environmental framing, so we cannot feel the body alone 
independent of its wider Umwelt. If we lie down close our eyes and simply try 
to feel ourselves alone and motionless, what we will feel, if we are attentive, is 
the environmental surface on which we are lying and the environing air we are 
breathing and feeling on our exposed body surfaces. 
7. Such non-visual feelings of the body remind us that if architectural design is 
based on the soma and aims to enhance somatic experience, it should be critically 
attentive to the soma’s multiplicity of senses. These senses, as neurophysiologists 
now realize, go beyond the traditional ve and include some that are identied as 
distinctively somaesthetic senses in the narrow sense of dealing with sensory per-
ception through the body per se rather than through its particular sense organs 
(eyes, ears, nose, tongue, etc.).
III
If the soma is the crucial medium through which architecture is experienced 
and created, then developing its critical discriminatory powers could enrich 
architecture’s critical and creative arsenal, since critical perception is always 
part of the creative process. It is often said that our term criticism comes from 
the Greek word for a judge “krites” (κριτης) but it ultimately comes from the 
Greek verb “krino” (κρινω) which means to distinguish, discriminate, sepa-
rate; hence the adjective (κριτικος) the counterpart of our term critical means 
“able to discern” or discriminate.9 Recalling this core sense of discrimination 
can help us address, with the help of somaesthetics, two of the greatest chal-
lenges to criticality in architecture: the problem of autonomy and the problem of 
atmosphere.
1. Autonomy connotes independence, and one prominent (spatially derived) 
notion of independence implies a separation from that of which one is indepen-
9 For more on the Greek terms, see Liddell and Scott’s Greek-English Lexicon (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 1997). Interestingly, design—a core concept of architecture has a rather 
similar etymology of distinguishing or marking off: deriving from the Latin de + signare to mark 
off or separate—as in the articulation of space through making signs or marks.
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dent. That separation is reflected in the notion of critical distance, where the 
critic sustains his objective judgment by having a point of view somehow external 
to the object or situation she is judging rather than being essentially involved 
or implicated in it. The idea of the judge as disinterested observer conveys the 
same sense of critical distance. But contemporary theory has shown that a purely 
external viewpoint for judging our natural, social, and cultural world is logically 
untenable; such a view would be a view from nowhere and from which we would 
see nothing meaningfully. We simply cannot stand outside the world to assess it 
altogether apart from the interests we have and seek in it. Today’s thoroughly 
globalized political, economic, and media networks reinforce in concrete socio-
cultural terms this message of our essential, inextricable implication in the world 
and world order. 
Architects have not been slow to draw the conclusion by questioning the 
notion of autonomy on which several versions of critical architecture rely.10 In 
using the energies, institutions, permissions, monies, and other affordances 
of establishment society, the architect cannot avoid being somehow entangled 
and complicit with it. That the architect is somehow “a surfer on the waves of 
societal forces” forms part of Rem Koolhas’s questioning of architecture’s criti-
cal posture, a suspicion that “there is in the deepest motivations of architecture 
something that cannot be critical” and that leads him into the far broader eld 
of urbanism to urge a radically uncritical outlook: “we have to dare to be ut-
terly uncritical…we have to become irresponsible,” embracing a “Nietzschean 
frivolity.”11
Such post-critical arguments may seem compelling if the critical attitude is 
presumed to require an external, autonomous standpoint—altogether detached 
and disinterested. But that basic presumption can be challenged by recalling the 
10 In proposing a “post-critical” architectural approach, Somol and Whiting dene the critical 
position (exemplied in different ways by Michael Hays and Peter Eisenman) as presuming “that 
autonomy is a precondition for engagement” and that such autonomy implies some sort of sepa-
ration or distance from other things, sometimes described as being “between” other disciplines 
or discursive formations. Robert Somol and Sarah Whiting: “Notes Around the Doppler Effect 
and Other Moods of Modernism.” In: Perspecta, 33 (2002), p. 73. 
11 Rem Koolhaas: “What Ever Happened to Urbanism.” In: Rem Koolhaas and Bruce Mau: S,M,L, 
XL (New York: Monacelli Press, 1995), p. 971, for the quotes on uncritical Nietzschean frivolity. The 
other quotes are taken from Hilde Heynen: “A Critical Posture for Architecture?” In: Jane Ren-
dell and Jonathan Hill (eds.): Critical Architecture (London: Routledge 2007), p. 51, and George 
Baird: “Criticality and its Discontents,” Harvard Design Magazine, 21 (2004–5), p. 649 who takes 
this Koolhaas quote about architecture’s deepest (and uncritical) motivations from an oral re-
mark, quoted by Beth Kapusta in the Canadian Architect Magazine, 39 (August 1994), p. 10.
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soma. We can critically examine aspects of our somatic experience without going 
outside our bodies to some putative detached, disembodied mind. We use a nger 
to probe a small bump on our face; we use our tongue to discover and remove 
the traces of food on our upper lip or on our teeth. We discriminate or assess 
our pain within the painful experience not only after it has passed and we are, in 
that sense, beyond or outside it. Beyond these ordinary practices of somatic con-
sciousness, a variety of meditative disciplines are structured on heightening the 
soma’s conscious critical self-examination.
In short somatic self-examination provides a model of immanent critique 
where one’s critical perspective does not require being entirely outside the situ-
ation critically examined but merely requires a reflective perspective on it that 
is not wholly absorbed in the immediacy of what is experienced; a perspective 
better described as positionally eccentric (or decentered) rather than as external. 
Such perspectives can be achieved by efforts of disciplined willful attention but 
also often arise spontaneously through experiences of somatic dissonance where 
unreflective coordination is disrupted and so stimulates a decentered, reflective 
critical attention to what is going on. Critical somatic consciousness involves 
some aspects of the soma’s complex array of systems examining other aspects of 
that complexity. 
I could say far more about the relations between unreflective immediacy and 
reflection in body consciousness, and how these different modes can be inte-
grated to maximize the quality of our experience and performance. But retaining 
the crucial point that criticality requires no position of complete independence or 
externality, I now turn to the second major challenge to architectural criticality: 
the problem of atmosphere. 
2. Deriving from the Greek words for vapor and sphere, atmosphere’s primary 
meaning is air, thus suggesting lightness, intangibility, a certain formlessness and 
elusiveness that can readily evoke a sense of frivolity or lack of gravitas, struc-
ture, or substance. In modernist architectural discourse the notion of atmosphere 
had a typically negative nuance, suggesting a vaguely subjective quality without 
Somatic self-examination 
provides a model of 
immanent critique where 
one’s critical perspective 
does not require being 
entirely outside the situ-
ation critically examined but 
merely requires a reflective 
perspective on it that is not 
wholly absorbed in the imme-
diacy of what is experienced.
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clear structural form or function but also something gratuitous, frivolous, con-
trived, and articial or impure.12 
With the decline of architecture’s modernist paradigm (and its positivist, ratio-
nalist, objectivist, and minimalist ideologies), there has been increasing recogni-
tion of atmosphere’s important architectural role.13 Architectural meaning and 
12 Despite atmosphere’s primary sense of air and hence lightness, modernism’s critique of at-
mosphere focused on the sort of articially intensied atmosphere that was thickly laid-on as an 
ornamental effect to heighten mood or intoxicate perception. Though air is essentially light we 
can speak of a heavy or stale atmosphere. 
13 The decline of criticality in architecture is sometimes linked with the waning of the modernist 
paradigm. It is certainly true that various trends in the modernist movement of architecture had 
utopian visions that were critical of the hierarchical social status quo that was both reflected in 
traditional architectural structures and sustained by them. But it also needs to be remembered 
that key gures in modernism equally advocated a realistic, pragmatic policy of reconciling ar-
chitectural ambitions with the hard realities of the socioeconomic world. For instance, Bauhaus 
visionaries such as Walter Gropius and Ludwig Mies van der Rohe justied their departure from 
the earlier utopian expressionism by emphasizing the need for a pragmatic acceptance of the 
new realities of technological progress, new materials, and living conditions. If Gropius urged 
a “resolute afrmation of the lived environment of machines and automotive vehicles,” without 
“romantic beautication,” then Mies insisted that “we take the changed economic and social 
conditions as a fact,” since “these things go their own destined way, blind to values” and the 
designer can only accept “these realities” in order to bring out from them something of value. 
See Walter Gropius: “Grundsätze der Bauhausproduktion” (Dessau), 1926. In: Ulrich Conrad 
(ed.): Programme und Manifeste zur Architektur des 20. Jahrhunderts (Bauwelt Fundamente: 
Braunschweig, 1975) p. 90.  Ludwig Mies van der Rohe: “Die neue Zeit,” 1930, in Conrad, 114. My 
translation. Here are the quotations in German, rst Gropius:
 “Nur durch dauernde Berührung mit der fortschreitenden Technik, mit der Erndung neuer 
materialien und neuer Konstruktioinen gewinnt das gestaltende Individuum die Fähigkeit, die 
Gegenstände in lebendige Beziehung zur Überlieferung zu bringen und daraus die neue Werk-
gesinnung zu entwickeln:
 – Entschlossene Bejahung der lebendigen Umwelt der Maschinen und Fahrzeuge.
 – Organische Gestaltung der Dinge aus ihrem eigenen gegenwartsgebundenen Gesetz heraus, 
ohne romantische Beschönigungen und Verspieltheiten.”
 Now thw quote from Mies:
 “Die neue Zeit ist eine Tatsache; sie existiert ganz unabhängig davon, ob wir ‘ja’ oder ‘nein’ 
zu ihr sagen. Aber sie ist weder besser noch schlechter als irgendeine andere Zeit. Sie ist eine 
pure Gegebeneit und an sich wertindiferent. Deshalb werde ich mich nicht lange bei dem Versuch 
aufhalten, die neue Zeit deutlich zu machen, ihre Beziehungen aufzuzeigen und die tragende 
Struktur bloßzulegen.
 Auch die Frage der Mechanisierung, der Typisierung und Normung wollen wir nicht 
überschätzen.
 Und wir wollen die veränderten wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Verhältnisse als eine Tatsache 
hinnehmen.
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value cannot be reduced to tectonics and denable visual or structural forms. A 
crucial dimension of architecture is what its articulated spaces mean and contrib-
ute to the lived experience of those who dwell in those spaces and pass through 
them. A signicant part of that lived experience of meaning and value is what ar-
chitectural theorists now generally denote as atmosphere. This notion, which de-
serves extended analysis, seems to encompass the vast array of perceptual quali-
ties, dominant feelings or moods, and ambient effects that emerges not only from 
the complexity of forms, relations, and materials of the articulated space, but also 
from the complexity of practices, environmental effects, and experienced qualities 
that pervade the lived space of a building or other architectural structure. 
The increasing attention given to atmosphere can be traced to new direc-
tions in aesthetic theory, but also to broader cultural trends that challenge the 
traditional emphasis on the weighty, the substantive, the resistant as that which 
denes what is truly real. Our new media and technologies (with their corre-
sponding new economies and ethos) are dematerializing the traditional heaviness 
of the life world, so that the previously invisible atmospheric dimension of our 
environments (through which our ever more electronically and nano-technically 
shaped experience is conducted) now emerges as powerfully real and essential. 
As one popular thinker puts it (with characteristic errant faith in our unlimited 
resources): “It is through the occurrence of abundance in the modern that the 
heavy has turned into appearance—and the ‘essential’ now dwells in lightness, in 
the air, in the atmosphere.”14 Moreover, we should remember that airiness has, in 
our cultural history, very strong associations with spirituality.15 This extends even 
to architecture, where, as Peter Eisenmann notes, “the airy” is associated with 
“the sublime” in contrast to the materiality of the grotesque.16 Aura, which is also 
frequently used to convey the notion of atmosphere (and derives from the Greek 
for air or breath) is often applied with lofty or spiritual connotations. Walter Ben-
jamin’s famous theory of art’s aura, for example, clearly links it to the elevated, 
religious atmosphere of ritual or cultic use.17
 Alle diese Dinge gehen ihren schicksalhaften und wertblinden Gang.
 Entscheidend wird allein sein, wie wir uns in diesen Gegebenheiten zur Geltung bringen.”
14 Peter Sloterdijk: “Against Gravity,” an interview with Bettina Funcke, ArtForum/BookForum, 
February/March, 2005, cited from http://www.bookforum.com/archive/feb_05/funcke.html 
15 There are etymological roots for this spirituality, as the Greek root is related to the Sanskrit 
word for breath or soul (atman). 
16 Peter Eisenman: “En Terror Firma: In Trails of Grotexts,” Architectural Design, 1–2 (1989), 
p. 41.
17 Walter Benjamin: “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” Illuminations, 
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In recent architectural theory, the turn to atmosphere has been closely 
linked to the so-called post-critical project. But post-critical should not be 
confused with acritical. The post-critical turn to atmosphere is also a serious 
critical response to the perceived limits of earlier views of architecture that 
denigrated or neglected the atmospheric as irrelevant to architecture’s disci-
plinary practice and mission, and that dened architect’s disciplinarity (and 
criticality) in terms of autonomy. Thus Somol and Whiting afrm the post-criti-
cal trend as a move “that shifts the understanding of disciplinarity as autonomy 
to disciplinarity as performance or practice,” and that identies the dening 
core of architectural practice within a broad notion of design that includes the 
atmospheric: “Design encompasses object qualities (form, proportion, material-
ity, composition, etc.), but it also includes qualities of sensibility, such as effect, 
ambiance, and atmosphere.”18
Atmosphere’s challenge to criticality does not disappear, however, even if 
we take a more comprehensive, more sensible view of criticism as involving 
not only negations, resistances, and oppositional attitudes but also construc-
tive assessments, interpretations, and positive appreciations. Atmosphere 
remains problematic for criticality because any mode of criticism that claims 
to be reasonable, principled, and in some sense objective rather than arbitrary 
seems to logically require some object against which critical propositions can 
be measured for accuracy and insight. But atmosphere does not provide such 
an object, because it is precisely something that is dened by its contrast to 
conventional objecthood. It distinctively lacks the clear contours, rm and en-
during substance, and discrete individuality of ordinary objects in space. Nor is 
atmosphere something that can be reduced to a mere matter of purely personal 
private space, a merely personal, idiosyncratic reaction, because different 
individuals obviously share common perceptions of atmosphere. Theorists of 
trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken, 1969), pp. 221 – 227.
18 Somol and Whiting, see note 10, p. 75.
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atmosphere have noticed that it hovers in an intermediate space between the 
objective and subjective.19 
Atmosphere is, I think, best understood as an experienced quality of a situ-
ation, and such qualities are notoriously resistant to conceptual denition and 
discursive analysis. If it dees clear categorization as objective or subjective, 
this is because atmosphere is a qualitative feature of a situation that is typically 
grasped as an absorbing whole before that situation is divided into its objective 
and subjective elements.20 Atmosphere is experienced by the subject as a percep-
tual feeling that emerges from and pervades a situation; and like other perceptual 
feelings, atmosphere is experienced in large part as a bodily feeling. 21 
Such somatic experienced qualities are typically very difcult to analyze 
because they are not xed in stable objects, and they tend to be felt in terms of 
nameless, elusive, and often transient feelings. Further difculties in critically 
analyzing these somatically perceived atmospheric qualities derive from the fact 
that we are not habituated to pay explicit attention to the bodily feelings involved 
in our perception, because the habitual focus of our attention and interest is 
the external world of objects.22 Perceptual feelings are experienced somatically 
with different levels of awareness, and most of these feelings function beneath 
full consciousness. While asleep, I still can feel that a pillow inhibits my breath-
ing and so I adjust myself to move it without ever regaining consciousness. Even 
when we are awake, most of our somatic feelings or perceptions do not reach 
explicit consciousness or awareness because our attention is elsewhere direct-
ed. In descending a staircase, we are rarely aware of our kinaesthetic feelings 
of movement, our proprioceptive feelings of balance and extension in space, and 
the tactile qualities of contact that our feet make with the steps. But we must at 
least implicitly feel these qualities for the soma to react properly in coordinating 
our movement. Such implicitly felt qualities exert a signicant influence on our 
19 See Gernot Boehme: “Atmosphere as the Fundamental Concept of a New Aesthetics,” Thesis 
Eleven, 36 (1993), pp. 113 – 126.
20 I have similarly argued that our initial or immediate experience of art is not neatly divided 
into distinct categories of qualities or meanings (for example, “aesthetic” versus “ethical” quali-
ties and meanings). See Richard Shusterman: “The Convergence of Ethics and Aesthetics,” in 
Sanda Iliescu (ed.): The Hand and the Soul: Ethics and Aesthetics in Architecture and Art 
(Charlottesville, Va: University of Virginia Press, 2009), pp. 33 – 43.
21Walter Benjamin, at one point, likewise describes the aura as something that we perceive 
bodily by “breathing” in the atmosphere of its situation—“a peculiar web of space and time.” 
I here quote from the rst German version of Benjamin’s essay reprinted in his Gesammelte 
Schriften (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1991), p. 440.
22 I explore these problems and their remedies in Body Consciousness.
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behavior, attitudes, and moods.23 They constitute the core of atmosphere, and 
atmosphere too is something that often affects us without our even being aware 
of it as an explicit dimension of our experience. 
Many of the qualities that constitute atmosphere are not simply somatically 
perceived but also relate to senses that are distinctively bodily—namely, our 
proprioceptive, kinaesthetic, vestibular, tactile, senses. Our sensory experience 
of architecture is far more than the changing visual input as we survey and walk 
through its spaces. There are feelings of light and shade that are felt on our flesh 
and not just through vision. We feel the different temperatures and movements 
of air on our skin as we move through architectural space (along with the smells 
that the air brings us that stimulate the senses in our nostrils and mouth. There 
are also all the tactile and muscular sensations of walking through the space 
—the feel of the surface material beneath our feet, the rhythm of our footsteps, 
the kinaesthetic feel, proprioceptive balance, and muscular effort of traversing 
a courtyard or ascending or descending a staircase or adjusting one’s gait and 
posture to negotiate a narrow corridor or low door. As the soma is trained or 
habituated to adjust to different kinds of spaces (at once physical and social), so 
it implicitly reacts proprioceptively to the changing kinosphere without one usu-
ally noticing it; and such reactions often have an affective dimension with real 
aesthetic signicance and sociopolitical import. A huge kinosphere that dwarfs 
the visitor entering the space of an authoritative power, a demanding staircase to 
approach the elevated throne of authority provide familiar examples of how archi-
tecture can instill an atmosphere of majesty that is at once potently aesthetic and 
political. 
If architectural theory recognizes that the more tactile, somaesthetic senses 
are crucial to architecture’s experienced atmosphere, the presumption remains 
that these dimensions of atmosphere are in principle too elusive for the exercise 
of criticality. The locus classicus of this influential presumption is Walter Ben-
jamin’s famous account of architectural experience that contrasts tactile and 
optical perception while also comparing architectural experience to that of lm. 
Unlike painting (with its traditional aura of uniqueness), lm and architecture 
both enable a “simultaneous, collective experience” for aesthetic reception “by 
the mass audience” (234). But Benjamin then contrasts lm and architecture in 
terms of the former’s greater possibilities for critical consciousness through its 
objectifying representational photographic technologies and optic focus as op-
23 Indeed as some philosophers and neuroscientists have argued, they even guide our processes 
of rational thinking. See Body Consciousness, ch. 5 – 6. 
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posed to architecture’s problematic resistance to critical consciousness through 
its predominant reliance on habits of tactile appropriation.
“Buildings,” writes Benjamin, “are appropriated [the German is the less dy-
namic rezipiert] in a twofold manner: by use and by perception—or rather, by 
touch and sight. Such appropriation [Rezeption] cannot be understood in terms 
of the attentive concentration of a tourist before a famous building. On the tactile 
side there is no counterpart to contemplation on the optical side. Tactile appropri-
ation is accomplished not so much by attention as by habit” (240). We should note 
how Benjamin’s terminology does not even give tactile experience the full status 
of perception (Wahrnehmung), which connotes cognition and active conscious-
ness but rather suggests blind absorption (Rezeption) through the mechanism of 
habit. Benjamin goes on to argue that this unthinking, uncritical tactile absorp-
tion through habit also “determines to a large extent even optical reception” in 
architecture. Moreover, through its persistent deployment in the ubiquitous realm 
of architecture, this uncritical mode of habitual, somatic reception “acquires 
canonical value” or pervasive power that extends to other domains of culture 
and of life, where, in times of great historical change, the challenges that face 
human perception and adjustment “cannot be solved by optical means, that is, by 
contemplation [or focused attentive consciousness], alone” (ibid.) Benjamin can 
then return to lm experience and argue that there too, reception by the masses, 
though optical, is still essentially a reception governed by habit and characterized 
by distraction that thus “requires no attention”. Thus the mechanical reproduc-
tion of art is matched by an unfocussed, “absent-minded,” uncritical reception 
through the mechanism of habit (241). 
Benjamin provides no evidence that the tactile feelings we experience in archi-
tecture must remain in the realm of inattentive, absent-minded, mechanical habit 
that precludes explicit awareness for critical assessment. There is nothing in 
tactile and other distinctively somatic feelings that prohibits our perceiving them 
with conscious, focused attention – and in many conditions we do. In everyday ex-
perience we often notice and even try to describe varieties of pain, itches, tickles, 
caresses, sensual pleasures, feelings of dizziness, speed, hot, cold, and the feel of 
different surfaces and fabrics on our skin. Benjamin, of course, is right that our 
habitual way of experiencing architecture is in term of blind inattentive habit. But 
habits, as learned (even if implicitly learned) behavior, can be changed, and not 
all habits are blind and inattentive. Though Benjamin understandably contrasts 
habit with attention, there are indeed habits of attention; and developing such 
habits is an essential key for success in education and life. It is certainly true that 
most of us are far better at focusing critical attention on visual representations 
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than on tactile or somaesthetic feelings, and there may be reasons for this beyond 
the effects of mere habit (for example, evolutionary reasons and factors concern-
ing the way that distance and visual spatial array can facilitate individuation and 
objectication). But we should not erect a dualism between optical and tactile 
perception, because the former in fact intrinsically involves the latter, as the very 
act of vision necessarily deploys the muscular movement of our eyes and thus the 
tactility of proprioception—or feeling of muscular movement. Moreover, as recent 
research in the visuo-motor neuron system has shown, perception is signicantly 
transmodal such that seeing an action will also activate neurons involved in the 
motor or muscular performance of that action, and apparently vice versa. 
If Benjamin argues that our habitual and absent-minded tactile reception 
of architecture has rendered its optical reception likewise inattentively absent-
minded, then why not turn the tables and argue that by heightening our attention 
to the tactile or somaesthetic feelings of architectural reception we could render 
such perception not only more acute, penetrating, and critical but also sharpen 
our attentiveness and penetration of architecture’s optical experience. It is an 
anatomical fact that one’s rotational range and ease of vision can be increased 
by improving, through proprioceptive sensitivity, the rotational range of one’s 
spine. Moreover, by training and exercising somaesthetic attention we can gain 
a more attentive and explicit consciousness of the vague but influential somatic 
feelings that constitute our experience of architectural atmosphere and thus a 
more focused, more discerning awareness for its critical analysis. Such training 
is valuable for improving the critical sensibilities not only of designing architects 
but also of the various populations who inhabit architectural spaces and whose 
informed input on architectural design would be useful, if such design is truly 
meant to serve them best. There are a variety of methods for training such som-
aesthetic sensibility, which I discuss in my book Body Consciousness; they are 
best demonstrated in workshop settings and not from the podium in huge lecture 
spaces such as this, whose atmosphere is inappropriate for such training, and 
where I’d need to take more time and demand even more acute and patient atten-
tion than you have already granted me. Thank you.24
24 I also wish to thank the organizers of the conference for inviting me, and to give particular 
thanks to Olaf Pfeifer for providing me with helpful bibliographical assistance in preparing this 
lecture.
